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Abstract – In the light of the economically rational expectation theory, this article shows how 
an expert chooses an optimal oil price forecast function given that information is costly. In 
this framework we propose an expectational process which nests all processes considered in 
the literature. By aggregating individual processes, it is shown that the overall expectational 
process may result from individual mixing effects and/or group heterogeneity effects. Using 
Consensus Forecast survey data, for three and twelve month horizons, we find that the 
rational expectation hypothesis is rejected and that none of the traditional extrapolative, 
regressive and adaptive processes and macroeconomic fundamentals is relevant. We show 
however, that a combination of the three traditional processes explains satisfactorily oil price 
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Modeling price expectations in the oil market: 






  Oil price shocks are among the main impulse shocks introduced in macroeconomic 
models to study the time path describing adjustment towards equilibrium (Garratt and Hall, 
1997). Generally, these shocks (inventory shocks, credibility of OPEC’s intervention in a 
target zone model, OPEC’s pricing arrangements, conflicts, drilling field discoveries…) are 
introduced exogenously in these models. In turn, by altering supply and demand on different 
markets in the economy (Wirl, 1991), they produce feedback effects on oil prices because of 
changes in the fundamentals (Hawdon, 1989; Walls, 1987) but also because of changes in 
price expectations (Hawdon, 1987, 1989; Rauscher, 1988; Hammoudeh and Madan, 1995). 
Hence, a complete understanding of the oil price movements requires a better understanding 
of how price expectations are formed. However, the processes that govern these expectations 
remain widely unknown. Indeed, literature deals with price expectations implicitly, that is, by 
focusing on oil future demand prospects (Stevens, 1987) or by supposing that oil supply is 
based on a rational expectation scheme (Walls, 1987). Furthermore, studies concerning 
rational expectation hypothesis are not conclusive regarding this hypothesis. Moosa and Al-
Loughani (1994) find that futures prices on the WTI appear to be inefficient predictors of spot 
prices, and that the time-varying risk-premium hypothesis tested using a GARCH-M 
framework in not fully capable of explaining this result, leaving the question of whether or 
not expectations are rational unsolved. 
 
Using private WTI oil price expectations revealed by Consensus Forecasts survey 
data, this article aims to shed light on these issues.
1 The economically rational expectations 
framework introduced by Feige and Pearce (1976) is appropriate to study the formation of 
expectations to the extent that it is based on a cost-and-advantage analysis of information. In 
this framework, agents collect and use information until equality is reached between the unit 
cost of information and the marginal gain due to the use of this information. This provides a 
general theoretical basis for all processes from the naive process to the Muthian rationality 
through the traditional extrapolative, regressive and adaptive processes and any combination 
of them. This article sets out to show which of these a priori possible processes are validated 
by empirical data.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the microfoundations of 
expectational processes and discusses the aggregation conditions of individual expectations. 







2. The economic rationality of expectational behavior 
                                                           
1 Numerous studies based on survey data have attempted to model expected prices in various markets (exchange 
rates, stock prices, commodity prices, interest rates), but no such literature is devoted to oil price expectations.  3   
 
Despite an extensive literature on the microeconomic foundations of the rational 
expectation hypothesis (REH), studies considering a general form of rationality to explain the 
formation of expectations, where the REH appears to be a limit case, are surprisingly scant. 
To partially fill this gap in the literature we devote this section to this issue.  
 
2.1.  The case of costless information and unlimited cognitive ability   
 
Here, the dynamics function is observed without bias and thus expectations are 
homogenous and rational. For different representations of the variable to be forecasted, say 
the logarithm of the oil price  t p , the optimal forecast models can be determined in the sense 
that they provide the minimum forecast error variance. Consider the following simple 
examples:  
 
(i)  Assume that the dynamics of the change in  t p  is a series of random observed shocks 
which are common knowledge :  
 
1 1 ) 1 ( − − − − = − t t t t p p ξ β ξ ,         (1) 
 
where  t ξ  is a white noise with zero mean and constant variance 
2
ξ σ  and represents the effect 
on the endogenous variable of qualitative or quantitative announcements or events that are 
observed but unpredictable. Solve for  t ξ  using the lag operator on the one hand, and take 
expectations at t-1 on equation (1) on the other hand. Writing the former relationship one 
period backward and reporting it into the latter, one can verify that the expectations follow the 
adaptive process (Muth, 1960):  
 
) )( 1 ( 1 1 t t t t t t p p E p p E − − = − − + β      (2) 
 
  Furthermore, from equation (1) and from the adaptive process write both the shock  t ξ  
and the forecast 1 + t t p E  conditionally on the current and past observations of  t p . Then it can 
be easily shown that  1 1 1 + + + − = − t t t t p p E ξ . Therefore the adaptive process is optimum since 
the forecast error variance is minimum (equal to 
2
ξ σ ). 
 
(ii)  Assume that the change in  t p  has an autoregressive representation of the form: 
 
t t t t t p p p p η γ + − = − − − − ) ( 2 1 1     (3) 
 
where  t η  is a white noise with zero mean and constant variance 
2
η σ . It follows that the 
optimal expectational process is the extrapolative process (Baillie and MacMahon, 1992): 
 
) ( 1 1 − + − = − t t t t t p p p p E γ       ( 4 )  
 
since this process provides the minimum forecast error variance 
2
η σ . 
 
 
(iii)  Assume that the change in  t p  exhibits a mean-reversion dynamics of the form:  4   
 
t t t t p p µ p p υ + − = − − − ) ( 1 1 ,   1 0 < < µ      (5) 
 
where  p  is some target value and  t υ  an unobservable white noise with constant variance 
2
υ σ . 
It therefore follows that the optimal expectational process is the regressive process (Holden, 
Peel and Thomson, 1995): 
 
) ( 1 t t t t p p µ p p E − = − +       (6) 
 
since this process provides the minimum forecast error variance 
2
υ σ .  
 
(iv)  Similarly, if the change in  t p  is represented by lagged macroeconomic factors, the 
expected change in oil price is given by actual and lagged macroeconomic variables.  
 
Of course one can consider a complex dynamics defined as some combination of the 
preceding basic dynamics and it can be easily shown that the optimal expectational process is 
then a mixed process. In this case, expectations are still homogenous and rational in the 
Muthian sense. 
 
2.2.  The case of costly information and limited cognitive ability  
 
Contrary to the homogeneity and rationality of expectations assumed in 2.1, the 
empirical results based on survey data on oil price expectations suggest that expectations are 
heterogeneous and biased. In accordance with the economically rational expectation 
hypothesis, we relax the assumption that agents use the true dynamics function and show that 
this framework is consistent with heterogeneous and biased expectations.     
 
 
2.2.1. Microeconomic behavior of forecasters 
 
The optimizing behavior of an economically rational forecaster can be represented as 
follows. Assume that the forecaster j  bases their forecast on three independent types of 
information: history of observed and expected values of oil prices (type z ), other 
macroeconomic information that can be used to forecast oil prices (type v) and stochastic 
observable oil shocks (type ϕ ). Assume further that the squared forecast error is a function of 
the amounts 
j
t z H , , 
j
t v H ,  and 
j
t H , ϕ  of information of type  v z,  and ϕ  used at the time the 
forecast was generated, such that:   
 








t z t t
j
t H H H f p p E ϕ = − + +    ϕ , , 0 , 0
" ' v z i f f
i i H H = > <  
 
The signs of the first and second derivatives represent the assumption that the 
marginal efficiency of the amount of information in terms of the forecast accuracy decreases. 
Let the unit price of collecting (purchase  price of the information, time spent to get the 
information) and processing (cost of analyzing the information) each type of information for 
agent  j  be 
j
t z c , , 
j
t v c ,  and 
j
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where  0 >
j
t π  represents the aversion of agent  j  of misestimating future oil prices and       
(.) f
j
t π  is a loss function. 
 
The solutions of the minimization of this total cost yields to the equilibrium conditions 
of the forecaster: 
) , , (
'
, *





t i = − =      (7) 
 












t Hϕ  are chosen by the forecaster such that the 
marginal gain, i.e. the marginal decrease in the loss function, due to the decrease in the 
forecast error equals the unit cost.
2 For an agent  j , a given time t and a given type of 
information, Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the quantity of information, its unit 
cost and the marginal gain, the amounts of the other types of information assumed to be 
given. In the upper quadrant, the bisecting line represents the equilibrium locus corresponding 
to (7), while in the lower quadrant the effect of the amount of information on the marginal 
gain is sketched. For a given unit price  1 c , the point D corresponds to an initial sub-optimal 
situation in which the marginal gain is less than  1 c  and the information used is  D H . By 
diminishing the amount of information used, i.e. as  D H  reduces to 
*
1 H , the agent increases 
the marginal gain up to the optimum level N . At this point, the situation D has converged 
towards the equilibrium point  1 E . Consider next a new cost  1 2 c c <  that moves the 
equilibrium point  1 E  down to  2 E . It is clear that at this new point, the optimal quantity of 
information has increased from 
*
1 H  to 
*
2 H .
3 The maximum unit price  max c  is the limit price 
such that for all prices exceeding or equal to  max c , the optimal amount of information chosen 
is zero. Such a situation may be obtained for a lower value of  max c  if the marginal gain line is 
flatter with respect to H  such that it crosses the marginal gain axis at  ' M  instead of M : this 
corresponds to a lower sensitivity of the loss function to new information. The case of 
0
* = H  may particularly be viewed as a noise trader’s behavior for whom all unit cost is 
higher than their  max c  and whose forecast is purely stochastic. All these cases show why it 
may be rational for an agent not to use all available information. Conversely to the case 
0
* = H , the point  max H  refers to the maximum amount of costless information the agent is 
able to collect and process in the limits of their cognitive capacity. The part of the H  axis 
below  max H  represents the inefficiency locus of information, i.e. some kind of “information 
trap”: beyond this threshold, the agent cannot reduce their squared forecast error. In the case 
the cognitive capacity of the agent is unlimited and the cost supported is zero,  max H  
corresponds to all the relevant information, the agent thus forms rational expectations in the 
Muthian sense and the squared error is the lowest possible. For a higher level of 
j
t π , the 
marginal gain line shifts to the right. The agent who has a higher aversion to misestimating 
future oil prices either collects more information for a given unit price, say  1 c , or accepts to 
purchase their optimal amount of information, say 
*
1 H , at a higher unit price. 
                                                           
2 It is interesting to point out the analogy between the total information cost minimizer forecaster’s behavior and 
the utility maximizer consumer’s behavior.   
3 If the cost of the information obtained by imitating is less than the one supported when the information is  
purchased to its own price, then  1 E  represents an isolated forecaster’s equilibrium while  2 E  corresponds to a 
mimetic agent’s equilibrium. 6   
 












t Hϕ  is associated the dynamics 
function the agent will choose to represent the change in prices. The higher (lower) the 
optimal amount of information of each type, the more complex (simple) the dynamics and the 













t z H  is weak: the agent is likely to refer only to a 
simple autoregressive dynamics to form their forecast, in which case their expectations will 









t Hϕ  is the only non-zero set of information, the agent will observe a series of 




t v H  is the optimal 
non-zero set of information, then the expected change in prices depends on the expected 
change of macroeconomic variables. Obviously, when various types of information are used, 
a source of complexity concerning the dynamics other than an intensive use of a given type of 
information arises.  
 












t Hϕ  allow agent  j  to select 
at any time a given representation of prices, and let 
j
t p  be the value generated by this 
representation.
4 A general representation of prices which nests all individually optimal 













t v z p p 1 1 1 ' ' − − − − + + = − ϕ α ϕ δ λ      (8) 
 
where 
j λ  and 
j δ  are (m,1) and (k,1) vectors of coefficients and 




t z 1 −  and 
j
t v  are vectors of variables (in levels, rates of change, spreads,…) of types z  and v 
and 
j
t ϕ  an individual zero-mean stochastic variable representing the total effect at time t of 
economic shocks which have occured between t-1 and t. The fact that variables of type z  are 
at least one-period lagged is a necessary condition for equation (8) to allow for forecasting. 
Conversely, the variables of type v and ϕ  may be actual to account for a contemporaneous 
effect. The endogenous variable is the theoretical change in prices that is generated by the 
chosen dynamics function. Note that by retaining this function, the agent accepts 
j
t p  to differ 
from the observed prices  t p , the spread variable 
j
t t p p −  containing voluntarily uncollected 
costly information and corresponding in Figure 1 to the difference between  max H  and 
* H . 
 
                                                           
4 According to the theory of information, the quantity of information related to a random variable X  (here a 
variable of a given type) taking a finite number N of values (representing the different states of the nature) with 
probabilities  N p p p ,...., 2 1,  is given by the coefficient of entropy  ) 0 (
1
> − = ∑
=
k p Log p k H
N
i
i i X . For a 
given  N , the entropy is maximum when  N i N pi ,..., 1 / 1 = ∀ =  (the state of the nature is unpredictable) 
and minimum, that is  0 = X H , when the probability of one of theN realizations is 1 (the state of the nature is 
fully predictable).   
5 For the sake of simplicity, the coefficient of the actual shock is assumed to equal one. Any positive value 
would keep the analysis unchanged. 7   
We now determine the expectational process agent  j  will use on the basis of the 
dynamics they have chosen. Write equation (8) one period ahead. Expectations at time t of 














t v E z p p E ϕ α δ λ − + + = + + 1 1 ' '     (9) 
 
Equation (9) may also be written as: 
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' ' 1     (10) 
 
where L is the lag operator. Substituting (10) into (9) and rearranging we get:  
 






















t v E v E z p p E p p E − + − + − + + − = − α δ λ α    (11) 
 
  Equation (11) is the general representation of the expected change in oil price, which 
nests all the individual optimal processes. It states that the expected change in oil price 
depends on the last forecast error, on currently available information about history of prices 
and on actual and lagged macroeconomic forecasts. Note that for any lagged variable of type 
v, expected values correspond to actual or past values. Otherwise, macroeconomic forecasts 
entering equation (11) must be determined as well. We assume the macroeconomic type 
variables are themselves generated by a dynamics function similar to (8), thus involving their 
own past observed and expected values, other macroeconomic variables and macroeconomic 
shocks. Hence, their expected change can be modeled using a specification analogous to (11). 
This shows that processing macroeconomic type information is very costly and, to justify the 
cost, it must yield to a substantial marginal gain. Under the very strong condition that the 
quantity of information of type v is unlimited, solving the equation (11) for the expected 
change in  t p  will yield to a full description of this forecast in terms of all relevant variables 
of the economy. This solution is consistent with the rational expectation hypothesis.  Equation 
(11) also states that the agent’s opinion about the future rate of change in  t p  includes 
j
t p  and 
not the observed price. This is because, in a context where information is costly (i.e. 
0 ≠ −
j
t t p p   j ∀ ) and where this cost may vary across agents, the retained dynamics function 
(8) results from an individual choice and may differ from one agent to another. This explains 
why, in response to the question regarding the future rate of change in  t p , that is what will 
t t
j






t p p E − +1  based on 
their own dynamics function (8). Hence, these two forecast concepts are equivalent in the 
mind of the agent, and this also holds for any expected macroeconomic type variable. 
Equation (11) can thus equivalently be written as: 
 
















t v E v E z p p E p p E − + − + − + + − = − α δ λ α    (12) 
 
      We show now how equation (12) encompasses all kinds of standard expectational 
behavior considered in the literature. In this perspective, assume that the vector of type z  is 
limited to  3 = m  variables, such that: 
 













j p E p p p p p z − − − − − + − + − = λ λ λ λ     (13) 
 8   
where 
j
t p  is the target value of  t p  according to an agent. The first two components describe 
the effects of changes in price and in the target. The third component states that the agent 
believes there exists a strength making the price converge towards a “normal” value 
represented by the target. Replacing (13) into (12), and for the following set of parameter 
identifications:  
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where the k+4 scalars k ρ ρ µ µ γ β ,..., , , , , 1 2 1  denote some structural parameters assumed to be 
invariant across agents and  ) 3 ,..., 1 ( + = k i
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i ω  and  j i
j
i ∀ ∀ ≤ ≤ , 1 0 ω , equation (12) can be written in the form of a weighted 
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4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 42 1
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1
43 42 1 4 4 43 4 4 42 1
ω β ω ρ ω
µ µ ω
γ ω β ω
  (15) 
 
with 1 0 ≤ ≤ i µ  (i=1,2) and  1 0 ≤ ≤ β . Although the theoretical sign of the parameter γ  is 
more likely to be positive, a negative value is conceivable in so far as it reflects a naive 
regressive process (systematic turning tendency). The theoretical value of  |γ | should also be 
less than one for the expectations not to explode or collapse.  
 
  Equation (15) is a weighted average of a standard adaptive process, a standard 
extrapolative process, an error-correction form regressive process
6 and k fundamentalist 
processes. Concerning the error-correction form regressive process, notice that it leads to the 
same equilibrium value 
j
t p  that the one imbedded in the traditional regressive model. On the 
other hand, there is no reason here to consider the adaptive component as a particular case of 
the ECM.
7  For appropriate one or zero values given to the weights, model (15) can represent 
                                                           










t p p p p p E p E − − − − + − + − = − µ µ  such that the endogenous 
variable becomes t t
j
t p p E − +1 , we obtain the error-correction component of equation (15). 
7 In the expectational ECM,  1 + t
j
t p E  converges towards its normal value 
j
t p , while in the expectational 
adaptive model,  1 + t
j
t p E  converges towards the observed value  t p .  
 9   
any traditional expectational behavior in the literature, including naive expectations (i.e. the 
change in prices is a martingale difference sequence) when all weights are zero. Moreover, 
for values of the weights lying between zero and one the model describes any process mixing 
behavior of the forecaster and in the case all relevant information is used it corresponds to the 
Muthian rationality. For all these reasons the model can be viewed as an encompassing model 
of expectation formation. 
 
2.2.2. Aggregation of individual behavior  
  
 Let  n be the number of forecasters concerned by oil price. Taking the average of (15) 
across all agents, the expected change in oil price at the aggregate level can be written in the 
following form:   
 
[] ) 16 ( ) ) 1 ( (
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and where  t b  represents the aggregation bias, expressed as:  
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ω µ ω µ µ ω µ ω β
 
 
  Equation (17) states that the bias depends on covariances between individual weights on 
the one hand and opinion variables or other weights on the other hand. In a study devoted to 
aggregation bias, Prat (1995) shows, on the basis of stochastic simulations, that the 
aggregation of individual processes assumed to be alternatively adaptive, regressive and 
extrapolative does not alter the form of the process even by imposing strong heterogeneity. It 
follows that the aggregation bias does not hide any of the adaptive, extrapolative and 
regressive components. Moreover, the author finds that the average of individual parameters 
remain close to those of the aggregate model. Assuming that aggregation is still robust in the 
case of macroeconomic variables, we will admit that the part of the variance of  t t t p p E − +1  
explained by the variance of  t b  is negligible even if  t b  has a non-zero mean.  
 10   
Equation (16) can account for any partition of the population of forecasters, and the 
weights may be given different meanings depending on the partition. To illustrate this, we 
will consider two limit cases. In the first case, suppose that all agents refer to the same 
complex dynamics (8) with their own coefficients. There is thus a unique group of forecasters 
each of whom use a forecast function as in (15). We call this polar case the pure individual 
weighting effect, whose aggregation over all agents leads to equation (16). Assume now that 









i n n , each of them using one and only one of the  3 + k  components of the forecast 
function (15). In this other polar situation, which we call the pure group-heterogeneity effect, 
the weights 
j
i ω  are such that: 
 
 
0 ... ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 1 3 4 3 2 1 = = = = = +
j
k
j j j j ω ω ω ω ω   for any adaptive agent (group 1);   
0 ... ; 0 ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 3 4 3 2 1 = = = = = +
j
k
j j j j ω ω ω ω ω   for any extrapolative agent (group 2); 
0 ... ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 0 3 4 3 2 1 = = = = = +
j
k
j j j j ω ω ω ω ω   for any regressive agent (group 3);  
0 ... ; 1 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 3 4 3 2 1 = = = = = +
j
k
j j j j ω ω ω ω ω   for any fundamentalist agent who 
forecasts on the basis of the expected 
value of the variable 
j
t v1  (group 4); 
      … .       … .  
1 ... ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 3 4 3 2 1 = = = = = +
j
k
j j j j ω ω ω ω ω   for any fundamentalist agent who 
forecasts on the basis of the expected 
value of the variable 
j
kt v  (group k+3).
  










i ω  that  i n ni i ∀ = / ω . All the coefficients 
i ω  in equation (16) now represent the frequencies of agents belonging to each of the k+3 
groups.
8 The expected change in  t p  provided by the consensus may then be represented as 
the weighted average of the forecasts made by the k+3 groups. Here again, the average 
expectation is given by (16). It is interesting to note that since all the k+3 groups cannot make 
accurate forecasts simultaneously, model (16) necessarily generates a systematic aggregate 
forecast error. Hence, the occurrence of any set of heterogeneous groups of forecasters is 
sufficient for expectations not to be rational at the aggregate level. In fact, the group-
heterogeneity and the individual mixing effects may act simultaneously so that there may 
exist a very large number of possible partitions of agents forming the consensus. Let  N d ∈  
denote the number of different components of a mixed process. For any  {} 3 ,..., 2 , 1 + ∈ k d , 
there are at most 
d
k C 3 +  possible d-mixed processes candidate to describe the consensus at time 
t. In the case  1 = d , there are at most  3 + k  basic possible processes, and this refers to our 
second polar example. In the case  3 + = k d , there is only one single group of agents who all 
use a combination of  3 + k  basic processes, and this refers to our first polar example. Since 
                                                           
8 A well-known illustration introduced by Frankel and Froot (1987) involves two groups of forecasters, 
repectively called by the authors the “chartists” (assumed to adopt an extrapolative process) and the 
“fundamentalists” (assumed to follow a regressive process where the target may or may not include limited 
information).  11   










k C  
partitions of the consensus.  
 
2.2.3. Generalizing for the forecast horizon 
 
  Hitherto, we set the whole framework on the implicit assumption that the forecast 
horizon is equal to the frequency of the observations (i.e. one unit of time). We now call τ  
the forecast horizon such that  1 ≥ τ . The general form for any τ  of the dynamics function 
generating the rate of change in 
j p  between t-τ  and t is (the subscript τ  will be omitted 
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t v z p p     (18) 
 
  Following the same steps as (8) through (12) to find the individual forecast function and 
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j
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t b  is an aggregation bias assumed to be negligible. Define now 
3 = m  and  , 1 1 − − = t t
j












t p E p z  similarly to equation (13). If 
an identification system similar to (14) holds, the coefficients in (19) may be written as 
i i i 3 1 ) 1 ( ω β ω α + − =  for  τ ,...., 1 = i ,  γ ω λ i i 2 1 = ,  1 3 2 µ ω λ i i = ,  2 3 3 µ ω λ i i = ,  1 4 1 ρ ω δ i i = ,…. 
k i k ki ρ ω δ , 3 + =  for  1 ,...., 0 − = τ i , where  si ω   ) 3 ,..., 1 ( + = k s  is the weight corresponding to the 
i’th lagged value of the s’th expectational component. It is easy to check that for  1 = τ  
equations (18) and (19) simplify to (8) and (16) respectively.  
  
 
3. Evidence on the expectational process used by experts 
 
  Assuming that the aggregate process chosen by experts is stable over time (i.e. the 
elements of equation (7) are time-invariant), we now attempt to identify empirically this 
process in the light of survey data. 
 
                                                           
9 We limit the number of lags in the exogenous variables of equation (18) to the horizon for the sake of 
conformity with the special case  1 = τ .  However the number of lags for variables of types  z  and v  can be 
easily extended beyond τ  without changing the general form of the forecast function (19). If the ϕ ’s lags were 
extended, equation (19) would become extremely cumbersome.    12   
3.1. The data  
  
  At the beginning of each month, «  Consensus Forecasts  » (CF) asks 180 or so 
economy and capital market specialists in approximately 30 countries to estimate future 
values of a large number of economic variables for 3-month and 12-month horizons. These 
variables are the production growth rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate, wage rates, new 
housing starts, company profits, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) oil price…. The WTI represents the international reference spot price of 
the US oil (US$ per barrel), and its global benchmark role is reinforced by the rejection of the 
regionalisation hypothesis (Gülen, 1999). Towards the end of each month, CF sends each of 
the bodies (scattered throughout the world) who have agreed to participate in the survey, a 
questionnaire which asks for their opinion on the future numerical values of WTI oil price. 
The consensus is the arithmetic average of the individual expected values of oil price and is 
published in the monthly CF newsletter. These consensus time series are used in this paper 
over the period November 1989 to January 1998. The coefficient of variation at each point in 
time (i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation of individual answers over the consensus) lies 
between 4% and 8% for each horizon, except during the Gulf crisis where it increases almost 
up to 20%. This indicates that the heterogeneity of individual expectations is neither 
negligible, nor large enough for the consensus to be irrelevant.  
 
Respondents are commercial or investment banks, industrial firms and forecast 
companies, whose forecasts influence many market participants’ decisions. These experts are 
identified with a confidential code, which only mentions their country. They are only asked to 
reply when they are sufficiently concerned by an economic variable. Only two thirds of the 
180 experts of CF answer the questions concerning future values of oil price. This confirms 
that experts who respond are those who are informed about the oil market and who are 
professionally concerned by the requested horizons. In this way, noise traders cannot bias the 
consensus because only informed agents are asked to respond. Since the individual answers 
are confidential (i.e. only the consensus is disclosed to the public with a time lag) and since 
each individual is negligible within the consensus, it is difficult to say that, for reasons which 
are inherent to speculative games, individuals might not reveal their « true » opinion. The CF 
requires a very specific day for the answers, i.e. at the beginning of the following month. As a 
rule, this day is the same for all respondents.
10 Finally, given that questions concern the 
expected levels of oil price, the expected change rate can only be determined with respect to 
the last spot price which is assumed to be known by the individuals the day they answer 
(reference price). It is thus clear that any mistake in the choice of the reference price date 
implies a mistake in the measurement of the expected change. However, the price values 
considered in this paper being dated from the day required by CF for the answers, the 
concentration of the answers on the same day implies that we can retain the same reference 
price for all respondents. 
  
As shown in the theoretical analysis presented in section 2, the opinion variable for 




t p p E − = +τ τ π ,  (i.e. agents 
consider the distribution of 
j
t τ π ,  prior to forming forecasts). Since agent is asked by 
Consensus Forecasts to give their opinion on the level (and not the log-level) of the future oil 
                                                           
10 We notice that this day may fall anywhere between the 1
st and the 8
th of the month. The effective horizons 
however always remain equal to 3 and 12 months. If, for instance, the answers are due on the 3rd of May (which 
was the case in May 1993), the future values are asked for August 3, 1993 (3 month-ahead expectations) and for 
January 3, 1994 (12 month-ahead expectations).   13   




t P P τ τ π =  for both  3 = τ  and  12 = τ  months. 








t p E p P p , , , ln  according to the expected return 
relationship. Thus, the logarithm of the forecast values of the price provided by the 
respondent  j  at time t for t+3 months and for t+12 months (
j e
t p 3 ,  and 
j e
t p 12 ,  respectively) 
correspond to the expected value of the logarithm of the future price for these horizons 
( 3 + t
j
t p E  and  12 + t
j
t p E ).   
 























τ . However 
the consensus value published by Consensus Forecasts is an arithmetic (and not geometric) 














τ τ . Hence, substituting 
e
t P τ , ln  for  1 + t t p E  generates a 
systematic bias on the aggregate expected oil price. It can be shown that the wider the 
dispersion of individual expectations the larger is the bias. Because this dispersion is rather 
low and stable over time for the two horizons (see above), this bias will be supposed to be 
constant. A second and similar source of measurement bias may result from the aggregation 
of individual targets. A last type of bias may be due to the non-zero mean of the  t b  term 
(equation (17)). We will therefore introduce in each process an intercept to capture the total 
bias, which allows us to replace 
e
t P τ , ln  by  1 + t t p E  in the empirical analysis to be in conformity 
with equation (19). Furthermore, the error term of the expectational process may capture a 
stochastic measurement error in expectations. 
  
 
3.2. Empirical results  
 
All basic or mixed processes are derived from the general equation (19) for  3 = τ  and 
12 = τ . The empirical exercise presented hereafter aims to identify the relevant process used 
by the respondents to Consensus Forecasts. We will first examine the relevance of the REH, 
which describes a situation in which the consensus is generated by an underlying process 
based on all available information (this process being unknown to the investigator).
11 We will 
begin by implementing ADF tests to the three variables of interest:  t p ,  3 + t t p E  and  12 + t t p E . 
At a 1% level of significance (with an intercept and one lag), all variables were stationary. It 
follows that the unbiasedness tests may be run on the log-levels of the variables.
12  For the 
two horizons, we obtain the following results: 
 
3 = τ , sample period: February 1990 – October 1997 (N=93) 
 
t t t t p E p ν ˆ 87 . 1 38 . 0
) 42 . 5 (
3
) 25 . 3 (
3 + + = + +   41 . 0 148 . 0 094 . 0
2 = = = DW SE R  
 
                                                           
11 It is worth noting that if all individuals are rational we should find that the consensus is rational. However we 
may find rational consensus although none of agents is rational. For instance, if the consensus was made by two 
agents, and if one of them had underestimated the importance of a given information (with respect to what 
would have been necessary to forecast correctly the future price), while the other had overestimated this 
information, we would find a rational consensus. 
12 Note that the specification in level avoids statistical biases due to overlapping data that would occur with first 
differences. Moreover the choice of the observed price as the endogenous variable allows to estimate the slope 
without the bias which would result from the unknown forecast error variance of the rational expectation.  14   
12 = τ , sample period: February 1990 – January 1997 (N=84) 
 
'
) 88 . 5 ( 12 ) 45 . 0 ( 12 ˆ 77 . 2 07 . 0 t t t t p E p ν + + = + +   34 . 0 119 . 0 01 . 0
2 = = − = DW SE R  
 
Generally, the hypothesis of unbiasedness involves testing the joint hypothesis that the 
slope is 1 and the intercept is zero.
13 Nevertheless, because of the possible measurement bias 
on the expected variable leading to a non-zero intercept, only the value of the slope accounts 
for the unbiasedness. Our results strongly reject the unbiasedness hypothesis for the 
consensus. Further, we implemented a Chow test on two equal sub-periods for the two 
horizons to verify the stability of these estimates. The test led us to accept the stability 
hypothesis of these parameters at the 1% level of significance, which suggests the absence of 
a learning mechanism allowing a convergence towards the REH: the barrier of costly 
information acts at any time. This confirms that aggregate expectations described by equation 
(19) are not rational.   
 
  However, these results do not preclude the existence of a significant group of rational 
forecasters in the consensus. If this group exists, we should be able to capture it empirically. 
In this case, the group uses all relevant information imbedded in (19) to produce unbiased 
expectations and the question is to determine whether the REH may be represented by a linear 
combination of variables included in (19). In this perspective, we regress the ex-post change 
in oil price  t t t p p F − = +τ τ , , which stands for the change expected by the rational group, on a 
large number of observed and expected variables and we find that for the two horizons,  τ , t F  
cannot be fit by any combination of these variables. However, rational agents may have used 
information other than that which we empirically exploited, as this information was unknown 
to us. To circumvent this methodological difficulty, we will consider the variable  τ , t F  as a 
proxy of all information used by rational agents. Hence, the introduction of the variable  τ , t F  
in the aggregate expectational process (19) allows us to test whether or not a significant group 
of rational agents belongs to the consensus. In other words, within our group-heterogeneity 
framework it makes sense to combine the REH with any other expectational hypothesis to 
account for the behavior of the consensus. Obviously, there is no sense to consider such a 
combination at the individual level because if the latter hypothesis is relevant the two 
hypotheses are redundant.  
 
  In order to run calculations, we needed a hypothesis about the target value of the oil 
price as it appears in the regressive process for each horizon. For the three-month horizon, we 
supposed that the target value is given by the aggregate 12 month ahead expected oil prices 
provided by the survey data, that is: 
 
       12 3 , + = t t t p E p            ( 2 0 )  
 
whereas for the twelve month horizon we retained - after having tried several other 
alternatives – a constant (long-run) target value, which is given by its mean over the period: 
 









          ( 2 1 )  
 
                                                           
13 This condition is not sufficient to prove the REH but its failure is sufficient to reject the REH. 15   
This assumption is in accordance with the fact that the time series  t p  was found to be 
stationary over the sample period. A direct consequence of equation (21) is that when 
12 = τ months, the rate of change in the target in (19) is zero.  
 
  The estimation of equation (19) including the variable  τ , t F  allows for the 
identification of relevant sets of information used by experts. For both horizons, the forecast 
error, the more-than-one-period lagged expected changes in  t p , the lagged regressive 
components and the actual or lagged macroeconomic components
14 did not appear to be 
significant. Furthermore, the more-than-two-periods lagged extrapolative components in the 
case  3 = τ  and the more-than-one-period lagged ones in the case  12 = τ  were also found to be 
insignificant.  These variables are therefore ignored in the remainder. In fact, for the 3-month 
horizon, the estimate of  10 1 11 λ α λ −  (composite coefficient of the one-period-lagged 
extrapolative component), the estimate of  10 2 11 1 12 λ α λ α λ − −  (composite coefficient of the 
two-periods-lagged extrapolative component) and the sum of the estimates of  1 α  and  10 λ  
(coefficients of the first order autoregressive component and of the actual extrapolative 
component, respectively) were not found to be significantly different from each other. For the 
12-month horizon, we found that the estimate of  10 1 11 λ α λ −  is not significantly different from 
the sum of the estimates of  1 α  and  10 λ . Hence, writing the term  t z1 10 λ  in the right-hand side 
as  t t z z 1 1 1 10 1 ) ( α λ α − + , we can write equation (19) equivalently as follows. First, the 
extrapolative component now defines the quarterly change in prices in the 3-month horizon 
model and the two-month change in the 12-month horizon model, instead of monthly 
changes. Second, the adaptive component is modified such that the last forecast is compared 
to the actual price and not to the lagged one. Although this is not the traditional adaptive 
behavior, we call it an early reappraisal adaptive behavior: agents do not wait until the end of 
the τ month horizon to revise their expectations, but they rather revise them in response to the 
first observed price. This particular adaptive behavior says that expectations are defined as a 
weighted average of actual and past monthly values of  t p  and not an average of quarterly or 
annual values of it (depending on the forecast horizon) as the traditional adaptive process 
states. 
 
Table 1 provides the significant components for the two horizons respectively. The 
estimate associated to  τ , t F
15 is reported when it is significant at the 5% level, while a hyphen 
(-) is used to denote that this variable was insignificant and has therefore been excluded from 
                                                           
14 These are observed and expected values of the rate of inflation, of the money stock, of the change in real 
GNP, of real investment, of the rate of interest and of the rate of unemployment revealed by the same CF survey. 
The weak influence of macroeconomic variables on asset price expectations also results from the survey by 
Gennotte and Leland (1990) who asked traders on NYSE market to provide the information their expectations 
are based on, and found that agents base their forecasts on observed stock prices rather than on fundamentals. 
15 Since the REH is represented as the sum of the variable  τ , t F  and a white noise forecast error, a bias may be 
generated in the estimation of any model in which  τ , t F  appears as a regressor. In order to appreciate the 
importance of this bias, we generate a new variable  τ τ τ υ , ,
'
, t t t F F + = , where  τ υ , t  is drawn from  ) , 0 ( τ σ N  
allowing different values for  τ σ , and estimate the models by substituting 
'
,τ t F  for  τ , t F  for each value of  τ σ . 
Even for rather high values of  τ σ (including the standard error of  τ , t F ), we observe that the estimates are not 
significantly different from those obtained by using the regressor  τ , t F  instead of 
'
,τ t F . This result allows us to 
use  τ , t F  in all regressions. 16   
the presented regression. Stationarity (ADF) test and Ljung-Box serial correlation test have 
been performed to the residuals of each of the twelve regressions. When the intercept was not 
significantly different from zero, it was dropped in the course of the final estimation and 
again this has been indicated with a hyphen. 
  
  Our results call for the following comments. While the ADF tests do not allow us to 
reject any of the processes, the Ljung-Box test is very discriminating. Regressions 5 and 10 
indicate the only process without serial correlation of the residuals for both horizons.
16 Since 
in this process all macroeconomic variables and  t t t p p F − = +τ τ ,  are insignificant, we call it an 
extrapolative-regressive-adaptive model with limited information (ERAMLI).
17 In fact, the 
adaptive component being included in the regressive process, there is no way to identify 
econometrically between the extrapolative-regressive process and the ERAMLI. Regressions 
5 and 10 may thus correspond to either of these two processes, but in the remainder we 
simplify by referring to the ERAMLI when talking about a 3-mixed process. The observation 
of Table 1 suggests that  τ , t F  is significant only when the limited information model is 
misspecified. This leads to the conclusion that there is no significant group of rational agents 
in the consensus. The estimates of regressions 5 and 10 correspond to the parameters  10 λ ,  1 α , 
20 λ , and  30 λ  of the theoretical equation (19) respectively and they all have the expected 
positive signs. It is important to note that the extrapolative component acts in the ERAMLI 
with a positive sign, contrary to what is generally obtained when this process is estimated 
alone. This result is satisfactory since it conforms to the intuitive idea that the extrapolation 
should maintain the past direction of the market. We also found that the intercept for each 
horizon is not significantly different from zero, and this suggests that the measurement biases 
if any compensate each other in average. 
 
Another implication of the fact that the regressive process imbeds the adaptive 
component is that if the former was relevant by itself, the coefficient of the adaptive 
component should not be significantly different from one. According to regressions 4 and 9, 
this is not the case and thus these equations represent a regressive-adaptive 2-mixed process 
for both horizons.  
 
To check for the colinearity between exogenous variables of the ERAMLI, we 
calculated the 
2 R  between each exogenous variable and the others and compared it to the one 
                                                           
16 It should be noticed that the 3-month horizon ERAMLI (regression 5) involves on both sides not only the spot 
price at time t but also an expectational variable, that is the 3-month expected price on the left hand side and the 
12-month expected price on the right hand side. This raises the question of whether or not there exists some 
possibility of spurious validation of the ERAMLI. To check this issue, we derived from the ERAMLI an 
equivalent equation in which all expectational variables dated at time t are gathered on the left hand side while 
actual and lagged spot variables and lagged expectational variables are gathered on the right hand side. There is 
thus no possibility for this last equation to be necessarily validated because of common information on both 
sides of the equation. By applying an iterative procedure, this transformed equation yielded to a set of estimates 
which is not significantly different from those of the regression 5. We then can conclude that these latter 
estimates cannot be attributed to any statistical necessity. For the 12-month horizon ERAMLI it should be 
noticed that regression 10 involves on both sides only the spot price. We then expressed the level of expected 
price in terms of actual price t p and the four exogenous variables of the ERAMLI. The estimate of  t p  appeared 
to be very significantly equal to 1, all the other parameters being insignificantly changed with respect to those of 
regression 10. This again confirms that the presence of  t p  at both sides of the equation involves no spurious 
correlation. 
17 Abou and Prat (2000) and Prat and Uctum (2000) have found similar mixed models with stock market and 
foreign exchange market survey data respectively. 17   
of the ERAMLI, as suggested by Johnston (1963, p. 295), and Kennedy (1985, pp. 150-153). 
For the three (twelve) month horizon, the 
2 R  values corresponding to each of the four (three) 
regressions were found to be less than 0.9 and less than the 
2 R  of the ERAMLI. These are the 
relevant conditions to conclude that colinearity does not introduce significant biases in the 
estimates. 
 
For the 3-month and 12-month horizons respectively, the observed and the fitted 
values of the expected rate of change of oil price according to the ERAMLI are such that the 
main fluctuations are well-represented (Figures 2 and 3). We particularly observe that there 
are no systematic time lags between the fitted and observed values, which is the sign of a 
good specification of the ERAMLI. This remark holds especially for the twelve-month 
horizon. 
 
We also performed White tests (not provided in Table 1) on the residuals of the 
ERAMLI to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level of significance since the p-values are found to be 
zero for both  3 = τ  and  12 = τ . Heteroskedasticity may be generated by aggregation biases 
not captured by the intercept or by the influence of (non-economic) extreme events such as 
the Gulf crisis. The abnormal spreads we observe during the Gulf crisis period (August 1990 - 
April 1991) between the observed and fitted values (Figures 2 and 3) are likely to be the 
source of the heteroskedasticity found over the whole period. Such extreme events may be 
accounted for by adding, in the dynamics function, a series of dummy variables  i t i − , ψ  
(i=0,1,…τ ) taking the value 1 when an extreme (and unique) event occurs between t and t-τ  










i  in equation (18), where 
j
i δ  is the impact on the 
change in oil price of the i-month-lagged extreme event according to agent j, it can be verified 
that the aggregate forecast function (19) is modified so as to include also the effects of the 








τ τ ψ δ α δ α
i
i t i i i . In order to examine the importance of these effects at each 
time of the period of the crisis (August 1990 - April 1991 included), we introduce nine 
dummy variables  9104 ,..., 9009 , 9008 D D D , which are equal to one on August 1990, 
September 1990,…, April 1991 respectively and zero elsewhere. By eliminating successively 
insignificant dummies, we found the following regressions for the two horizons:  
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2 = R ,  % 53 . 1 = SE , Ljung-Box probability = 62.60% (3 lags), ADF test: CI(1%) with 0 lag  
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n°12) 
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968 . 0
2 = R , % 42 . 0 = SE , Ljung-Box probability = 97.71%(3 lags), ADF test: CI(1%) with 0 lag 
    
 
Using these estimates, we calculated the part of the endogenous variable  τ π , t  
unexplained by the ERAMLI, that is: 
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It should be underlined that these two spread variables represent a « total shock », 
which may contain any exogenous influence due to intra-month historical events and any 
measurement or specification error in the ERAMLI. Although these effects are not 
distinguishable, it is interesting to present their overall evolution during the Gulf crisis. In this 
perspective, Figure 4 shows, for each horizon, the normalized values of  3 , t φ  and  12 , t φ  at the 
beginning of each month over the period June 1990 to December 1991, which contains the 
Gulf crisis. Between August 1990 and May 1991, the two spreads exhibit a higher volatility 
than they do outside of this period. This period starts with the crisis and ends around the end 
of the war. This suggests that, during the crisis, the ERAMLI and the extreme event effects 
explain complementarily expectations in the oil market.
18 We finally implemented the 
heteroskedasticity White test by transforming regressions 11 and 12 so as to eliminate from 
the endogenous variable the influence of the dummy variables. The test gives the 
2 NR  p-
value = 0.010 for the 3-month horizon and p-value = 0.803 for the 12-month horizon, which 
suggests the absence of heteroskedasticity at the 1% significance level for the former horizon 
and 5% for the latter horizon. These findings show that the Gulf crisis is sufficient to explain 
the heteroskedasticity reported above. More generally, the well-behaved residuals in 




                                                           
18 More specifically, increased tension among Gulf states pushed up oil price expectations sharply in the course 
of August 1990 (see the positive change of the two spreads between August and September), and the sign of this 
shock is conform with the high probability of a substantial fall in oil supply. It is worth noting that during 
September 1990, although the three month ahead expectations imbed a positive shock, the twelve month 
expectation exhibits an important negative shock. For the short term horizon, the fact that Iraq made it clear that 
the destruction of the Saudi oilfields would be a primary objective in the event of hostilities may explain the 
upward shock. In the long run, the panel of experts may have thought that, in all circumstances, the insufficiency 
in oil supply will vanish, and this may explain the negative slope of the 12-month oil price expectations. In 
October 1990, the perspective of a peaceful settlement to the Gulf crisis may have led also the 3-month 
expectations to sharply decrease. After the declaration of war (january 1991), the 3-months and 12-month spread 
variables exhibit negative and positive slopes, respectively : while in the short run the belief that the Allied 
forces would win in a short time may have led agents to foresee a reduction in their precaution oil storage, in the 
long run agents may have thought that the observed destruction of some oil wells will cause a rigiditiy of the oil 
production and hence increased prices. Stabilization of the spread variables is observed starting from May 1991. 
Overall, these historical events do not appear distinctly from the observation of expectations, but they do when 
we substract the fitted values provided by the ERAMLI from the observed expectations (i.e. when we consider 
the spread variables). This reinforces the relevance of this model. 
19 Hitherto, we ignored the feedback effect, that is the influence of price expectations on actual prices. The fact 
that the actual prices have been viewed as econometrically exogenous is unlikely to have altered the quality of 
the estimates presented above, in the extent that no specification bias has been detected with the tests 
implemented in this paper.  
 19   
  Expectations generated by the adaptive and regressive components of the ERAMLI 
are stabilizing in that by definition they converge to the spot price and the target respectively. 
The extrapolative process does not involve any convergence and therefore is not stabilizing. 
In order to appreciate the magnitudes of these two strengths, we decomposed the variance of 
the deterministic part of the endogenous variable corrected from the Gulf effect as the 
variance of the stabilizing factor (weighted sum of the regressive and of the adaptive 
components), the variance of the destabilizing factor (extrapolative component) and twice the 
covariance. These are respectively 37.29, 1.06, and –9.00 for  3 = τ  months and 6.15, 0.17 and 
–1.46 for  12 = τ  months. Hence, expectations can be viewed as exerting a stabilizing effect in 
the dynamics of the oil market for both horizons.  
 
Recall that the ERAMLI applied to the three-month horizon (regression 5) depends on 
the actual value of the twelve-month expectations, which represents the target of the 
regressive process as supposed in equation (20). On the other hand, we have explored the 
determinants of this target, which is the ERAMLI applied to the twelve-month horizon 
(regression 10). It becomes then interesting to examine jointly these two hypotheses by 
testing the robustness of the estimates of the 3-month ahead expectation model where the 
target is replaced by its fitted values. Indeed, if the residuals of the target model have a 
constant but too large variance with respect to the ones of the regressive components on the 3-
month model, we would expect the estimates of this model to be significantly worsened. 
Another advantage of such a « nested model » is to explain three-month expectations only 
with actual prices and the past values of expectations. Inferring the estimated target from 
regression 12 as  t t t t p p E + = + 12 , 12 ˆ ˆ π  and testing the 3-month horizon ERAMLI with this 
estimated target yields: 
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842 . 0
2 = R , % 07 . 2 = SE , Ljung-Box probability = 83.24% (3 lags), ADF test: CI(1%) with 0 lag  
 
  It is clear that estimates in regressions 11 and 13 are not significantly different. 
Moreover, as with the 3-month horizon model, the nested model provides stationary and 
serially uncorrelated residuals. Heteroskedasticity White test gives 
2 NR  p-value = 0.181, 
which leads to accept the null. These results validate jointly the two models.  
 
A final point we considered was the analysis of the time-stability of the ERAMLI by 
performing the (in-sample) Chow test on the three-month model, twelve-month (or target) 
model and the “nested” model. Because the Gulf crisis may be a source of instability of the 
structural parameters of the ERAMLI, the test has been implemented by eliminating from the 
endogenous variable the influence of the significant dummies over the crisis period. We 
considered 3 sub-periods of roughly the same sizes: March 1990 – September 1992 (N=31), 
October 1992 - April 1995 (N=32) and May 1995 – January 1998 (N=32). For each of the 
three models, the p-values obtained are 7.64%, 28.10% and 22.33%, respectively. We can 
thus accept the time stability hypothesis at the 5% level of significance whatever the model 
considered. This suggests that the retained hypotheses on the targets are econometrically 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
  In this paper we attempt to analyze the formation of oil price expectations in an 
economically rational expectation framework, which states that a forecaster chooses the 
optimal quantity of information such that the marginal gain due to the decrease in the forecast 
error equals the unit cost. This quantity of information corresponds to a dynamics function of 
oil price, and allows the agent to specify an expectational process. Starting with a general 
form of dynamics, we propose an encompassing model which nests all kinds of expectational 
processes considered in the literature and which we generalize for any horizon. A central 
implication of the framework is that expectations may be biased although economically 
rational. We also show that the aggregation of individual expectational optimal processes 
leads to an aggregate mixed process, which may be interpreted as resulting from individual 
mixing effects and/or group heterogeneity effects. We then attempt to identify empirically the 
effective components of this aggregate process.   
 
  Using Consensus Forecasts survey data for three and twelve month horizons, we found 
that not only the rational expectation hypothesis is rejected - whether it is supposed to hold 
for all experts or only for a group of them - but also that no macroeconomic fundamental is 
significant. Nevertheless, expectation formation appears to be characterized by an empirical 
complementarity among adaptive, regressive and extrapolative processes for both horizons, 
i.e. a mixed expectational model. Moreover, we show that the twelve month expectations 
appear to be a valuable target in the three month model. An important property of this model 
is that expectations exert a stabilizing strength in the oil market. Generally speaking, the 
mixing behavior seems to explain why the basic processes are inappropriate to describing 




















Abou A. and G. Prat, 2000,  Modeling stock price expectations: lessons from microdata, in: F. Gardes 
and G. Prat, eds, Price expectations in goods and financial markets: new developments in theory 
and empirical research, Edward Elgar. 
Agénor P.R. and P.J. Montiel, 1996, Development macroeconomics, Princeton University Press.  
Baillie R. and P. MacMahon, 1992, The foreign exchange market: theory and econometric evidence, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Feige E.C. and D.K. Pearce, 1976, Economically rational expectations: are innovations in the rate of 
inflation independent of innovations in measures of monetary and fiscal policy?, Journal of 
Political Economy, 84, 499-522  21   
Garratt A. and S.G. Hall, 1997, E-equilibria and adaptive expectations: output and inflation in the LBS 
model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21(7), 1149-71. 
Gennotte G. and H. Leland, 1990, Market liquidity, hedging and crashes, American Economic 
Review, December. 
Gilbert C.L. and T.B. Palaskas, 1990, Modelling expectations formation in primary commodity 
markets, in: L.A. Winters and D. Sapsford D., eds., Primary commodity prices: economis 
models and policy, Cambridge University Press, 44-69. 
Gülen S.G., 1999, Regionalization in the world crude oil market: further evidence, Energy Journal, 
20(1), 125-39. 
Hammoudeh S., 1996, Oil price, mean-reversion and zone readjustments, Southern Economic Journal, 
62(4), 916-29. 
Hammoudeh S. and V. Madan, 1995, Expectations, target zones, and oil price dynamics, Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 17(6), 597-613. 
Hawdon D., 1987, Short and long-run crude oil price expectations in 1986: results of a survey, in: P. 
Stevens, ed., Energy demand: prospects and trends, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 166-76. 
Hawdon D., 1989, Changing oil price expectations, in: D. Hawdon, ed., Oil prices in the 1990s, St 
Martin’s Press, New York, 115-27. 
Holden K., D.A. Peel and J.L. Thompson, 1985, Expectations: theory and evidence, St. Martin’s Press, 
New York. 
Johnston J., 1984, Econometric methods, MacGraw-Hill, Tokyo. 
Kennedy P., 1985, A guide to econometrics, Southampton, Basil Blackwell. 
Moosa I.A. and N.E. Al-Loughani, 1994, Unbiasedness and time varying risk premia in the crude oil 
futures market, Energy Economics, 16(2), 99-105. 
Muth J.F., 1960, Optimal properties of exponentially weighted forecasts, Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, june, 299-306.  
Prat G., 1995, La formation des anticipations et l’hypothèse d’un agent représentatif, Revue 
d’Economie Politique, 105(2), p.197-222. 
Prat G. and R. Uctum, 2000, The evidence of a mixed expectation generating process in the foreign 
exchange market, in: F. Gardes and G. Prat, eds., Price expectations in goods and financial 
markets: new developments in theory and empirical research, Edward Elgar.  
Rauscher M., 1988, OPEC behavior and the price of petroleum, Journal of Economics, 48(1), 59-78. 
Walls M.A., 1987, Petroleum supply modeling in a dynamic optimization framework: forecasting the 
effects of the 1986 oil price decline, Energy and Materials Discussion Paper, 87-03, december. 
Wirl F., 1991, Energy demand and consumer price expectations : an empirical investigation of the 














max c  
 
 
1 c  
 
 
2 c  
E1 
E2 


















D H  
 









Figure 1: relations between the quantity of information, its unit cost and the marginal 
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        Figure 2.  Three-month horizon expected rate of change in
        oil price: observed and fitted values according to the mixed
                      model, February 1990 - January 1998
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Figure 3.   Twelve-month horizon expected rate of change in
oil price: observed and fitted values according to the mixed
                model, February 1990 - January 1998
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Figure 4.    Stardardized values of the spread variables,
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Table 1.     Determinants of oil price expectations 
 
 
for the 3-month horizon 
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Notes- The endogenous variable is the expected change of the oil price 
t t t t p p E − = +τ τ π , , { } 12 , 3 = τ representing the horizon. Whatever τ , are reported at the first column the 
extrapolative component and at the second column the adaptive component. The third and fourth columns for 
3 = τ  and the third column for  12 = τ  provide the regressive component(s) in which targets are given by 
equations (20) and (21) respectively. Variable  t t p p − +τ  is a proxy of all information used by the rational 
agents if any. All variables are expressed in percent per quarter. C denotes an intercept. The sign « −  » denotes a 
coefficient not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; the estimates provided by the table are those of 
the regression without the corresponding variable. The values in brackets  under the estimates are the «  t-
values ». « SE » is the standard error of the regression. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: « CI α % » or « NCI 
α % » means CoIntegration or No CoIntegration at the α % level of significance and with the indicated number 
of lags in the equation of change in residuals. Ljung-Box probability test: if this probability exceeds 5%, the null 
hypothesis stating that the residuals are independent is accepted (the test takes into account three lags). 
 
 
 